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perfect *and necessary* being exists, and thus does not appear to force him to accept 'Og' in any sense full enough for the purposes of Kordig's argument as a whole.

On one interpretation of Kordig's argument for his first premise, that argument relies on a principle which leads to contradiction. On an alternative interpretation which avoids contradiction, the argument is sadly incomplete. I see no plausible reading of the argument, and no plausible argument to the same purpose, which avoids both of these flaws.

Kordig maintains that even atheists 'should grant a most perfect being *ought* to exist' (p. 207). Whatever its edificatory value, it does not appear that this 'should' has any important *logical* force. The atheist seems no more compelled to grant 'Og' than '◇g', and thus Kordig's deontic argument seems to offer no appreciable advance over its ontological predecessors.

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#### ON BEING A CAT

By E. J. LOWE

**I**N 'The paradox of the 1,001 cats' (ANALYSIS 42.1, January 1982), I argued that a lump of feline tissue *c* could not *be a cat*, on the grounds that the sortal terms 'lump of feline tissue' and 'cat' have different criteria of identity associated with them. To this Professor P. T. Geach replied, in effect, that something may *be a cat* without necessarily complying with the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'cat' (ANALYSIS 42.1, January 1982). My objection

to this, however, is that it can only be accepted if one also accepts (as Geach does not) that the predicate '— is a cat' is *ambiguous*.

My reasoning is simple. Contrast the sentences 'Tibbles is a cat' and 'c is a cat' (where 'c' denotes a certain lump of feline tissue). Let us grant that both sentences *are* true in *some* sense. It none the less must be the case that they are true in *different* senses. For the implication of saying that Tibbles is a cat is clearly that Tibbles complies with the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'cat' (and thus, for example, that Tibbles will not cease to exist merely upon the removal of a single hair). But, evidently, no such implication can attach to saying that *c* is a cat, in any sense in which this can be interpreted as true (since, for example, *c* will cease to exist upon the removal of a single hair). So it seems that we have here *two* different senses of '— is a cat', one of which demands that the subject of this predicate names something which complies with the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'cat', and the other of which does not. But once this is granted Geach's theory becomes untenable, and we are driven towards one like David Wiggins's, which distinguishes between an 'is' of identity and an 'is' of constitution (see his *Sameness and Substance*, Blackwell 1980, p. 30): *c* is a cat only in the sense that *c* constitutes a certain cat, viz., Tibbles. (Leslie Stevenson offers a somewhat different argument for the same conclusion in his 'The Absoluteness of Identity', *Philosophical Books*, XXIII no. 1, January 1982 (a discussion of Wiggins's book and of Harold Noonan's *Objects and Identity*, Nijhoff 1980).)

Is there any way in which a defender of Geach could respond to this objection? What seems undeniable is that 'Tibbles is a cat' implies that Tibbles complies with the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'cat', while 'c is a cat', in any sense in which it can be interpreted as true, does *not* imply that *c* complies with this criterion. Now, I have assumed that the difference between the implications of these two sentences must be attributed to an ambiguity in the predicate '— is a cat'. But could it not instead be attributed to a difference in sense between the two names 'Tibbles' and 'c'? (This suggestion was put to me in discussion by Stephen Read.) After all, it may be said, any proper name has associated with it the criterion of identity associated with a certain sortal term, the implication being that the bearer of that name must comply with that criterion. So it may be pointed out that 'Tibbles' and 'c' differ precisely in that the former has associated with it the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'cat', while the latter has associated with it the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'lump of feline tissue'. Now, may it not be argued that the reason why, for instance, 'Tibbles is a cat' implies that 'Tibbles' names something complying with the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'cat' has nothing to do with the sense of the predicate '— is a cat',

but everything to do with the sense of the proper name 'Tibbles' (and the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as regards 'c is a cat')? If so, it would seem to follow that '— is a cat' as it appears in these two sentences is *not* ambiguous.

My answer to this line of argument is as follows. I *accept* that the proper names 'Tibbles' and 'c' have associated with them the criteria of identity associated with the sortal terms 'cat' and 'lump of feline tissue' respectively. This means that 'c', for instance, can only be taken to name something which complies with the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'lump of feline tissue'. Thus 'c' cannot, in particular, be taken to name something which complies with the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'cat'. *But what does this last assertion amount to*, if not to saying that (in *some* sense) *c is not, and cannot be, a cat*? Surely this is a perfectly legitimate and intelligible way of putting the point; but if so, the clear implication is that we have here a distinctive use of the predicate '— is a cat', which must be different from any use it can have in saying truly that *c is a cat*. For we may take it as a consequence of a surely indisputable general logical principle that if the sentences 'c is a cat' and 'c is not a cat' may both be taken as true, they may, on pain of contradiction, only be so taken if the predicate '— is a cat' may be used in two different senses.

What I am arguing, thus, is that the very fact that proper names *do* have associated with them the criteria of identity associated with certain sortal terms, far from subserving the Geachian view that the predicate '— is a cat' is univocal, actually undermines that view. The point is that it is not as though (most) proper names wear their associated criteria of identity on their sleeves. ('Tibbles' is perhaps an atypical example in this respect, in that it is, purely by convention, rarely used to name *anything but* a cat.) Therefore we *need* a way of conveying to others *which particular sortal term's* criterion of identity is associated with the use of a given proper name, say '*N*'. Suppose the sortal term in question is 'cat': then what *better* way of conveying this information is there than by saying '*N* is a cat'? Natural language must possess a relatively simple way of conveying this important information, and there is, I think no good reason to doubt that in English it is done by a certain use of the predicate '— is a cat'. But if so, and if it is *also* claimed that a sentence like 'c is a cat' may be interpreted as true even though 'c' does *not* have associated with it the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'cat', but another and incompatible criterion, it must inevitably follow that the predicate '— is a cat' is *not* being used in this latter sentence in the same way as it was in the sentence '*N* is a cat', and hence that the predicate is, contrary to the Geachian view, ambiguous. For, clearly, in the sense of the predicate '— is a cat' in which it is used to convey the information that a proper name figuring as its subject has associated with it the criterion of identity associated with the sortal term 'cat' (i.e., as it

was used in our sentence '*N* is a cat'), it must be true to say that *c* is *not* a cat, given that '*c*' does *not* have that criterion associated with it. And then it follows, in consequence of our general logical principle, that '— is a cat' must have two different senses. (My own view, incidentally, is that the predicate '— is a cat', as it is used in a sentence like 'Tibbles is a cat', is used to say what *sort* or *kind* of thing an individual is, and I call such a sentence an *instantiation* sentence: see, e.g., my 'Laws, Dispositions and Sortal Logic', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 19, No. 1 (January 1982).)

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## A THESIS REFUTABLE BY A SENTENCE VERIFIABLE BY ITS USE

By JENNIFER HORNSBY

CONSIDER the following exchange:

*Goldman*: No action is a person's exemplifying of more than one act property.

*X*: But my delivering this sentence is my exemplifying at least two act properties.

*Lemmon*: *X*'s sentence is verifiable by its use.

If Lemmon is right, then what *X* says is true. But *X* has contradicted Goldman's statement of his thesis about the individuation of actions.<sup>1</sup> So if Lemmon is right, *X* has refuted Goldman's thesis.

Is Lemmon right? This was his definition:

A sentence *S* is verifiable by its use iff there are circumstances and a manner of delivery such that it is analytic that, for all people *x*, if in those circumstances *x* delivers *S* in the given manner, then what *x* delivers is true.<sup>2</sup>

The definition confirms that *X*'s sentence is verifiable by its use. The circumstances which guarantee that if *X* delivers his sentence in an assertoric manner then what he delivers is true are actual circumstances. For anyone uttering *X*'s sentence assertorically actually contradicts Goldman. If so, an act property that *X* exemplifies

<sup>1</sup> See the first two Chapters of Goldman's *A Theory of Human Action* (Princeton University Press 1970). I have used 'action' where Goldman would use 'act token'. Act tokens, Goldman thinks, can be identified *via* triples of persons, times, and act properties.

<sup>2</sup> E. J. Lemmon, 'On Sentences Verifiable by Their Use', *Analysis* 22.4, March 1962, pp. 86-9.