Stoic ontology

scheme originates with Chrysippus; (b) the first two genera are distinguished principally through the need, in response to Academic attacks, to give a coherent metaphysical account of change and identity; (c) the third and fourth genera have a variety of uses, especially in the analysis of allegedly abstract entities as bodies.

28 The first and second genera

A Plutarch, *On common conceptions* 1083a–1084a

(1) The argument about growth is an old one, for, as Chrysippus says, it is propounded by Epicharmus. Yet when the Academics hold that the puzzle is not altogether easy or straightforward, these people [sc. the Stoics] have laid many charges against them and denounced them as destroying our preconceptions and contravening our conceptions. Yet they themselves not only fail to save our conceptions but also pervert sense-perception. (2) For the argument is a simple one and these people grant its premises: a all particular substances are in flux and motion, releasing some things from themselves and receiving others which reach them from elsewhere; b the numbers or quantities which these are added to or subtracted from do not remain the same but become different as the aforementioned arrivals and departures cause the substance to be transformed; c the prevailing convention is wrong to call these processes of growth and decay: rather they should be called generation and destruction, since they transform the thing from what it is into something else, whereas growing and diminishing are affections of a body which serves as substrate and persists. (3) When it is stated and proposed in some such way, what is the judgement of these champions of the evident, these yardsticks of our conceptions? That each of us is a pair of twins, two-natured and double – not in the way the poets think of the Molionidae [legendary Siamese twins], joined in some parts but separated in others, but two bodies sharing the same colour, the same shape, the same weight, and the same place, <yet nevertheless double even though> no man previously has seen them. (4) But these men alone have seen this combination, this duplicity, this ambiguity, that each of us is two substrates, the one substance, the other <a peculiarly qualified individual>; and that the one is always in flux and motion, neither growing nor diminishing nor remaining as it is at all, while the other remains and grows and diminishes and undergoes all the opposite affections to the first one – although it is its natural partner, combined and fused with it, and nowhere providing sense-perception with a grasp of the difference. (5) . . . Yet this difference and distinction in us no one has marked off or discriminated, nor have we perceived that we are born double, always in flux with one part of ourselves, while remaining the
same people from birth to death with the other. (6) I am simplifying their
account, since it is four substrates that they attribute to each of us; or
rather, they make each of us four. But even the two are sufficient to
expose the absurdity. (7) If when we hear Pentheus in the tragedy say that
he sees two suns and a double Thebes we say he is not seeing but mis-
seeing, going crazy in his arithmetic, then when these people propose
that, not one city, but all men, animals, trees, furniture, implements and
clothes are double and two-natured, shall we not reject them as forcing us
to misthink rather than to think? (8) Here, actually, they can perhaps be
excused for inventing different kinds of substrates, for there seems no
other device available to people determined to save and protect the
processes of growth.

B Anonymous commentary on Plato’s *Theaetetus*, 70.5–26
The argument about what grows was first propounded by Pythagoras
[the supposed master of Epicharmus, cf. A 1], and was propounded by
Plato too, as we noted in our commentary on the *Symposium* [cf. Symp.
207d]. The Academics also defend it. They protest that they do believe in
processes of growth; but since the Stoics establish by argument this fact
which needs no proof, the Academics are teaching them that if someone
is prepared to prove things which are self-evident someone else will have
a plentiful supply of more convincing proofs to the contrary.

C Anonymous Academic treatise, Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 3008
... since the duality which they say belongs to each body is differentiated
in a way unrecognizable by sense-perception. For if a peculiarly qualified
thing like Plato is a body, and Plato’s substance is a body, and there is no
apparent difference between these in shape, colour, size and appearance,
but both have equal weight and the same outline, by what definition and
mark shall we distinguish them and say that now we are apprehending
Plato himself, now the substance of Plato? For if there is some difference,
let it be stated and demonstrated. But if <they can> not even say ...

D Stobaeus 1.177,21–179,17 (including Posidonius fr. 96)
(1) Posidonius says that there are four kinds of destruction and generation
from the existent to the existent. (2) For they recognized that there was
no such thing as generation from, or destruction into, the non-existent, as
we said before. (3) But of change into the existent he says that one kind is
by division, one by alteration, one by fusion, and one an out-and-out
change which they call ‘by resolution’. (4) Of these, that by alteration
belongs to the substance, while the other three belong to the so-called
‘qualified individuals’ which come to occupy the substance. And it is
along these lines that processes of generation come about. (5) The
Stoic ontology

Substance neither grows nor diminishes through addition or subtraction, but simply alters, just as in the case of numbers and measures. (6) And it follows that it is in the case of peculiarly qualified individuals, such as Dion and Theon, that processes of both growth and diminution arise. (7) Therefore each individual’s quality actually remains from its generation to its destruction, in the case of destructible animals, plants and the like. (8) In the case of peculiarly qualified individuals they say that there are two receptive parts, the one pertaining to the presence of the substance, the other to that of the qualified individual. For it is the latter, as we have said several times, that is receptive of growth and diminution.

(9) The peculiarly qualified thing is not the same as its constituent substance. Nor on the other hand is it different from it, but is all but the same, in that the substance both is a part of it and occupies the same place as it, whereas whatever is called different from something must be separated from it and not be thought of as even part of it. (10) That what concerns the peculiarly qualified is not the same as what concerns the substance, Mnesarchus says is clear. For things which are the same should have the same properties. (11) For if, for the sake of argument, someone were to mould a horse, squash it, then make a dog, it would be reasonable for us on seeing this to say that this previously did not exist but now does exist. So what is said when it comes to the qualified thing is different. (12) So too in general when it comes to substance, to hold that we are the same as our substances seems unconvincing. For it often comes about that the substance exists before something’s generation, before Socrates’ generation, say, when Socrates does not yet exist, and that after Socrates’ destruction the substance remains although he no longer exists.

E Porphyry (Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 48,11–16)

(1) Substrate is twofold, not only according to the Stoics but also according to the earlier philosophers. (2) For unqualified matter, which Aristotle virtually names, is the primary meaning of substrate. (3) The secondary meaning is that which is commonly or peculiarly qualified. For the bronze, and Socrates, are substrate to whatever comes about in them or is predicated of them.

F Iamblichus, On the soul (Stobaeus 1.367,17–22; SVF 2.826)

But the philosophers who follow Chrysippus and Zeno, and all who consider the soul to be body, collect its faculties as qualities in the substrate. They posit soul as substance already underlying the faculties, and out of these two dissimilar components they bring together a composite nature.
Even the Stoics place the commonly qualified individuals before the peculiarly qualified individuals.

The Stoics say that what is common to the quality which pertains to bodies is to be that which differentiates substance, not separable per se, but delimited by a concept and a peculiarity, and not specified by its duration or strength but by the intrinsic 'suchness' in accordance with which a qualified thing is generated.

... if in the case of compound entities there exists individual form — with reference to which the Stoics speak of something peculiarly qualified, which both is gained, and lost again, all together, and remains the same throughout the compound entity's life even though its constituent parts — come to be and are destroyed at different times.

But if form is that which is predicated in the category of essence of a plurality of numerically different things, in what does single individual differ from single individual, seeing that each is numerically single? Those who solve this difficulty on the basis of the peculiarly qualified — that one individual is distinguished, say, by hookedness of the nose, by blondness, or by some other combination of qualities, another by snubness, baldness, or greyness of the eyes, and again another by other qualities — do not seem to me to solve it well.

Nor, on the other hand, does the doctrine of the Stoics agree with Aristotle's doctrine about shapes, when they say that shapes too, like other qualified things, are bodies.

(1) The Stoics say that the qualities of bodies are corporeal, those of incorporeals incorporeal. (2) Their mistake arises from the belief that causes are of the same essence as the things affected by them, plus their supposition of a common account of explanation for bodies and incorporeals alike. (3) But how will the substance of corporeal qualities manage to consist of breath, when breath itself is composite?

(1) The Stoics too, on their own assumptions, could raise the same difficulty against the principle under discussion that all qualified things are so called with reference to a quality. (2) For they call qualities 'havable', and allow what is havable to exist only in the case of unified things; (3) whereas in the case of things which exist by contact, like a ship, or by separation, like an army, they rule out there being anything havable, or there being found in their case any single thing consisting of breath or possessing a single principle, such as to achieve a realization of a single tenor. (4) The qualified, however, is seen even in things whose constituents are in contact or separated. For just as a single grammarian is enduringly differentiated as a result of a qualified study and education, likewise the chorus is enduringly differentiated as a result of a qualified training. So they are qualified on account of their organization and their co-operation towards the fulfilment of a single function. (5) But they are qualified things which lack a quality. For there is no tenor in them, since a quality or a tenor is never found in separated substances which have no inherent union with each other.

N Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 212.12–213.1 (SVF 2.390, part)

(1) Some Stoics give a threefold definition of 'qualified', and say that two of the meanings are broader than quality, but that one, or part of one, matches it. (2) For they say that on one meaning everything differentiated is qualified, whether its condition be a process or a state, and difficult or easy to destroy. In this sense not only the prudent individual and the individual sticking his fist out, but also the individual running, are qualified individuals. (3) There is a second sense, in which they no longer include processes, but only states, and which they also defined as 'in a differentiated state': for example, the prudent individual, and the individual with his guard up. (4) The third and most specific sense of qualified which they introduced is one in which they no longer included those in non-enduring states, and in which the individual sticking his fist out and the individual with his guard up did not count as qualified individuals. (5) Even of these, the ones 'in an enduring differentiated state', some are of this kind in a way which matches the expression and notion of them, others in a way which does not match; and the latter they excluded, but the former, those 'matching and in an enduring differentiated state', they set down as qualified individuals. (6) By 'matching the expression' they meant those commensurate with the corresponding quality, like the grammarian and the prudent individual; for each of these is neither broader nor narrower than the corresponding quality. Similarly the gourmet and the wine-lover; whereas those who
combine these properties with the corresponding activities, such as the glutton and the tippler, are so called if they have their bodily parts in a suitable condition for indulging themselves. So if someone is a glutton, he is necessarily a gourmet too. But if he is a gourmet, he is not necessarily a glutton too; for when the bodily parts through which he practises gluttony become defective, he is free of his gluttony, but has not lost the tenor of a gourmet. (7) Thus 'qualified' has three senses, and it is in the last sense of 'qualified' that the quality matches the qualified. Consequently, when they define 'quality' as 'the state of a qualified thing', we must understand the definition as if the third sense of 'qualified' were being adopted. For 'quality' has a single sense, according to the Stoics themselves, while 'qualified' has three.

O Plutarch, On common conceptions 1077c–e

(1) One can hear them [the Stoics], and find them in many works, disagreeing with the Academics and crying that they confuse everything by their 'indiscernibilities' and force a single qualified individual to occupy two substances. (2) And yet there is nobody who does not think this and consider that on the contrary it is extraordinary and paradoxical if one dove has not, in the whole of time, been indiscernible from another dove, and bee from bee, wheat-grain from wheat-grain, or fig from proverbial fig. (3) What really is contrary to our conception is these people's assertions and pretences to the effect that two peculiarly qualified individuals occupy one substance, and that the same substance which houses one peculiarly qualified individual, on the arrival of a second, receives and keeps both alike. For, if two, there will be three, four, five, and untold numbers, belonging to a single substance; and I do not mean in different parts, but all the infinite number of them belonging alike to the whole. (4) At least, Chrysippus says that Zeus and the world are like a man and providence like his soul, so that when the conflagration comes Zeus, being the only imperishable one among the gods, withdraws into providence, whereupon both, having come together, continue to occupy the single substance of aether.

P Philo, On the indestructibility of the world 48 (SVF 2.397)

(1) Chrysippus, the most distinguished member of their school, in his work On the Growing [Argument], creates a freak of the following kind. (2) Having first established that it is impossible for two peculiarly qualified individuals to occupy the same substance jointly, (3) he says: 'For the sake of argument, let one individual be thought of as whole-limbed, the other as minus one foot. Let the whole-limbed one be called Dion, the defective one Theon. Then let one of Dion's feet be amputated.' (4) The question arises which one of them has perished, and
his claim is that Theon is the stronger candidate. (5) These are the words of a paradox-monger rather than of a speaker of truth. For how can it be that Theon, who has had no part chopped off, has been snatched away, while Dion, whose foot has been amputated, has not perished? (6) 'Necessarily', says Chrysippus. 'For Dion, the one whose foot has been cut off, has collapsed into the defective substance of Theon. And two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substrate. Therefore it is necessary that Dion remains while Theon has perished.'

We now turn to the first two of the four genera discussed at the end of 27 above. To place a thing in the first genus, 'substrate', is to attribute existence to it without mentioning its qualities. Hence the occupant of this genus is most commonly described as 'substance' (ousia, literally 'being' or 'existence'). This in turn is generally equated with primary matter (cf. q in vol. 2), viewed in abstraction as 'unqualified' (see 44). That is 'substrate' in its primary sense (E 2). In a secondary sense anything qualified may have the status of a substrate or matter (just as in Aristotle), in so far as it underlies further qualities and can survive the loss of those qualities (E 3; cf. A 4, F), like the clay in which a horse is modelled (D 10–12).

A quality is itself a second corporeal entity imbuing the matter, and able, thanks to its corporeality, to affect it causally (K, L). It is either the inseparable 'god' or 'reason' in the primary matter (see 44; 46), or, on the more typically Chrysippean analysis (see 47), the breath which runs through a body and informs it (L). The second genus is not strictly 'quality', but the 'qualified', that is usually (for exceptions see M, N 5–6) a substance viewed as 'having' (containing as parts) certain qualities (M; cf. 33J). Prudence is a quality, but the corresponding qualified thing is a prudent individual. Sometimes, however, this distinction seems to be neglected (K, O, P; 29E; 33M). Another common feature of Stoic usage, resulting from their preference for human examples, is the designation of the 'qualified' by the masculine instead of the expected neuter form of the adjective: in the translations of testimonies this is rendered as 'qualified individual'.

The cosmological theory of an active and a passive principle goes back to Zeno. But there is no evidence that Zeno or Cleanthes used it to make the metaphysical claim that an individual is in certain contexts properly treated as a 'substrate', in others as a 'qualified entity'. This distinction appears to have emerged only under the pressure of Academic attacks, with Chrysippus the key figure in the story. The Academics made great play of the Growing Argument, or 'argument about what grows' (A 1–2, B), traditionally traced back to the early fifth-century comic poet Epicharmus, who was quoted (Epicharmus fr. 2) as arguing that just as a number or measure when added to or subtracted from becomes a different number or measure, so too a person who grows or diminishes becomes a different person. This remains the core of the Academy's Growing Argument, although the problem was sometimes raised concerning any influx and efflux of material. Hence the Growing Argument was invoked in connexion with the Ship of Theseus, which was said to have been preserved for centuries at Athens, during which time every timber in it rotted and was
replaced: was it still the same ship (Plutarch, *Life of Theseus* 23)? If ancient discussions tend to concentrate on cases which, unlike this, involve growth and diminution, it is partly because these latter constitute the plainest examples of the general problem under which both types fall, how a thing can retain its identity between times $t_1$ and $t_2$ if what it consists of at $t_2$ is different from what it consisted of at $t_1$; partly because they provide a better analogue for the parallel case of numbers and measures invoked by Epicharmus (cf. *A* 2, *D* 5); and partly because the official upshot of the argument is a rejection of the concepts of growth and diminution, on the ground that ‘$x$ grows’ is only intelligible if $x$ exists at the beginning and end of the process, and the denial of identity over time seems to exclude this.

That the Academics propounded the puzzle along these lines emerges from *A* 1–2, and it seems to be Chrysippus, presumably in his work *On the Growing Argument* (*P* 1), who responded with the distinction between substance and the peculiarly qualified which is derided by the Academics at *A* 3–8 and *C*. (Plutarch’s *On common conceptions* seems to stem from the Carneadean Academy, and Chrysippus is his chief target throughout, cf. the explicit reference at *A* 1.) The theory will be clearer if we start from the later exposition of it in *D* by Posidonius and Mnesarchus, two Stoics active in the early first century B.C., even if their agreement with Chrysippus may be less than total. In *D* 1–4 Posidonius lists, not all kinds of change, but those by which a thing’s identity can be lost or gained — ‘destruction’ and ‘generation’. Normally (*D* 3–4) it is a qualified individual — say an egg — that is subject to such change, whether by division (into yolk and white), by fusion (into a cake), or by resolution (into its elements: cf. *SVF* 2.413). But for what the Stoics call a ‘substance’, i.e. a material substrate, any alteration can constitute a change of identity (*D* 4). Posidonius accepts Epicharmus’ analogy with numbers and measures (*D* 5), and with some plausibility: for if you make any addition to or subtraction from an undefined lump of matter, it thereby strictly speaking ceases to be the same lump of matter. Hence — a further consequence — a substance cannot be said to grow (*D* 5), since it cannot retain an identity through the process. What does endure, however, and constitutes a proper subject of growth, is the ‘peculiarly qualified’ individual, Theon, whose uniquely identifying characteristics must for this purpose be lifelong (*D* 6–7), despite the constant flux of their material substrate. Crucial to this whole enterprise is the observation (*D* 9–12) that Theon, although *constituted* by his substance or matter, is not *identical* with it. Hence we cannot infer Theon’s impermanence from the substance’s impermanence.

Here *D* 5–9 seems to match accurately the Chrysippean theory ridiculed by Plutarch at *A* 4; and at *A* 6 Plutarch puts it beyond doubt that it is the metaphysical distinction between the first two of the four Stoic genera that is the proposed solution to the puzzle. We thus have a *direct causal link* between Academic deployment of the Growing Argument and Chrysippus’ development of the theory of genera.

Strictly speaking ‘peculiarly qualified’ is only one half of the second genus ‘qualified’. This divides up (for the grammatical basis, see *33M*) into the ‘commonly qualified’, i.e. anything as described by a common noun or adjective;
and the ‘peculiarly qualified’, i.e. qualitatively unique individuals, as designated by proper names like ‘Socrates’. The former are prior to the latter (G), no doubt because to be a man, or white, is part of what it is to be Socrates, and not vice versa. What determines the quality of a given item is a ‘concept’ and a ‘peculiarity’ (H), and these may be taken to determine, respectively, its common quality and its peculiar quality. We will take these latter in turn.

In its loosest sense (N 2), the ‘qualified’ classifies anything possessing some inherent differentiating characteristic, however temporary, and this includes both absolute and relative properties, so long as the relative properties are inherent differentiations, like sweet and bitter, and not mere external relations like ‘on the right’ (29C). In the strictest sense (N 4–6), however, it is restricted to long-term dispositional properties, and one point of this may be to single out a type of quality which might in principle help to establish a thing’s identity over time and thus circumvent the Growing Argument.

A common quality is, in physical terms, a portion of breath, for example the portion of breath in Socrates that makes him a man. If it is asked in virtue of what this breath is describable as the quality ‘man’, the answer (H) will be that it corresponds to the universal concept ‘man’. That concept is not something present in Socrates; it is our own mental construct, a convenient fiction: see 30. A common quality is often also called a ‘tenor’ (hexis) — a term which picks out any unifying property of a body (M; see further, 47).

In turning now to the peculiar quality, we must observe that properly speaking it is this, and not the common quality, that constitutes a thing’s identity over time (D 6–7, I). However, it may perhaps have been suggested that a thing’s peculiar quality consists in a unique combination of enduring common qualities (J, e.g., for Socrates, ‘man’, ‘Greek’, ‘prudent’, ‘snub-nosed’, etc.). Many other useful differentiae, like ‘son of Sophroniscus’ and ‘friend of Alcibiades’, belong to the fourth genus, ‘relatively disposed’ (see 29C–F), and therefore cannot be elements in the peculiar quality. The peculiar quality must be an inherent property, not an external relation. Only on this supposition, added to the doctrine that no two individuals are qualitatively identical, was Stoic epistemology able to maintain, as it always did, that every individual can in theory be infallibly recognized through sense-perception (see 40).

It is in the light of this last thesis that the anti-Stoic invective in O must be interpreted. In attacking the theory, the Academics pointed to alleged cases of two things’ being qualitatively indiscernible (see further, 40H–J). The Stoic reply was that, if that were really so, one (peculiarly) qualified individual would, absurdly, occupy two substances (O 1). If, that is, Dion had a perfect double, there would be two materially separate Dion’s. (This would be particularly abhorrent to the Stoics, since they held that Dion’s identity over time depended on his possessing a uniquely identifying quality.) Plutarch’s Academic spokesman now tries to turn the tables with the suggestion that when the Stoics make Zeus and providence the joint occupants of aether during the conflagration (see 46) they are absurdly implying that two peculiarly qualified individuals can occupy one substance (O 3–4). It is crucial to see that this is presented as the unwelcome consequence of the Stoic cosmological doctrine, not as an explicit claim of the school. For the Stoics were themselves fully committed to the
principle that two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substance, as P amply confirms. Their reply to Plutarch's charge might be that, on the analogy cited in O4, Zeus and providence no more have the status of distinct individuals than do a man and his own soul.

A further Academic attack on the Chrysippean theory, at A and C, presents as absurd the idea of two entities, Dion and his substance, occupying the same place. This one is answered by the later Stoics at D9 with the careful distinction that a part (which is how Dion's substance stands to Dion), while not identical with the whole, is not different from it either (cf. 60G3; and Plato, *Parmenides* 146b).

Finally we turn to P, whose context is a fuller version of the anti-Stoic argument in O3-4. It cannot, as often supposed, concern two separate individuals who are made qualitatively identical by surgery, for it would then be about one peculiarly qualified individual coming to occupy two substances, as in O1, whereas it in fact speaks of two peculiarly qualified individuals coming to occupy one substance, as in O3. The key is to recognize this as the ancestor of a puzzle which has featured in recent discussions of place and identity. Take a cat, Tibbies, and assign the name Tib to that portion of her which excludes her tail. Tibbies is a cat with a tail, Tib is a cat without a tail. Then amputate the tail. The result is that Tibbies, now tailless, occupies precisely the same space as Tib. Yet they are two distinct cats, because their histories are different. The conclusion is unacceptable, and the philosophical interest lies in pin-pointing the false step.

That Chrysippus' puzzle works along similar lines is made clear by Philo's later comments, in which he takes Theon to be related to Dion as part to whole. Dion corresponds to Tibbles, Theon to Tib, and Dion's foot to Tibbles' tail. The differences are twofold. First, the problem is about occupying the same substance, not the same place. Second, Chrysippus assumes both the validity of the opening steps of the argument and the truth of the principle that two peculiarly qualified individuals cannot occupy the same substance at the same time. He therefore concludes that one of the two must have perished, and his problem is to see why it should be one rather than the other. Philo's elliptical summary leaves unclear his reason for selecting Theon for this honour (P6), but it is probably that if we are asked whose foot has been amputated we can only answer 'Dion's'. Theon cannot have lost a foot which he never had.

The title of Chrysippus' work shows that this puzzle was developed in connexion with the Growing Argument. But to what purpose? The following is a guess. According to the Growing Argument, matter is the sole principle of individuation, so that a change of matter constitutes a change of identity. Hence Socrates is a different person from the same individual with one extra particle of matter added. Now these two individuals are related as part to whole – just as Theon and Dion in the amputation paradox are related. Thus the paradox's presupposition that Dion and Theon start out as distinct individuals is not one that Chrysippus need endorse; it is a premise attributed for dialectical purposes to the Academic opponents, who cannot deny it without giving up the Growing Argument. But once they have accepted it, the Growing Argument is doomed anyhow. For whereas the Growing Argument holds that any material diminution constitutes a loss of identity, Chrysippus has presented them with a
case, based on their own premises, where material diminution is the necessary condition of enduring identity: it is the diminished Dion who survives, the undiminished Theon who perishes.

29 The third and fourth genera

A Alexander, On soul ii.118,6–8 (SVF 2.823)
We must disprove the [Stoic] thesis that there is a single power of the soul, such that the same thing when disposed in a certain way on individual occasions sometimes thinks, sometimes is angry, sometimes desires.

B Seneca, Letters 113.2 (SVF 3.307, part)
Virtue is nothing other than the mind disposed in a certain way.

C Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 166.15–29 (SVF 2.403, part)
(1) To put what I am saying more clearly, they [the Stoics] call ‘relative’ all things which are conditioned according to an intrinsic character but are directed towards something else; and ‘relatively disposed’ all those whose nature it is to become and cease to be a property of something without any internal change or qualitative alteration, as well as to look towards what lies outside. Thus when something in a differentiated condition is directed towards something else, it will only be relative: for example tenor, knowledge, sense-perception. But when it is thought of not according to its inherent differentiation but merely according to its disposition relative to something else, it will be relatively disposed. (2) For son, and the man on the right, in order to be there, need certain external things. Hence without any internal change a father could cease to be a father on the death of his son, and the man on the right could cease to be the man on the right if his neighbour changed position. But sweet and bitter could not alter qualitatively if their internal power did not change too. (3) If, then, despite being unaffected in themselves they change because of something else’s disposition relative to them, it is clear that relatively disposed things have their existence in their disposition alone and not through any differentiation.

D Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradictions 1054E–F (SVF 2.550, part)
[In On motion book 2 Chrysippus says that] the world is a complete body, but the parts of the world are not complete because they are disposed in certain ways relative to the whole and are not per se.

E Galen, On Hippocrates’ and Plato’s doctrines 7.1.12–15 (SVF 3.259, part)
(1) As a matter of fact, most of it really is true, especially what comes in the book where he [Chrysippus] shows that the virtues are qualified